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I. INTRODUCTION

On July 20, 2012, Plaintiff/Appellant Jeffry J. Black ("Black") filed his Opening
Brief on Appeal against the Defendant/Appellee, Idaho State Police ("ISP"), arguing that the
district court erred in granting ISP summary judgment on Black's claims made pursuant to the
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act, Idaho Code § 6-2101, et seq. ("Whistle blower Act").
ISP filed Respondents' Brief defending the district court's grant of summary judgment on
September 10, 2012. Black now submits this Reply Brief on Appeal and respectfully requests
that the Court reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of ISP and for
remand to the district court for further proceedings.

II. ARGUMENT

A.

Black has demonstrated that he engaged in activity protected by the Idaho
Protection of Public Employees Act.

L

The District Court misapplied authority regarding common law public
policy claims to Black's statutory claim under the IPPEA.

ISP argues that "[t]he district court's analysis demonstrates it understood that to
determine whether Black engaged in protected activity, it had to evaluate whether the undisputed
facts constituted a communication in good faith about a violation of law or a refusal to carry out
a directive that Black reasonably believed violated the law." Response Br., p. 9. ISP supports
this assertion by arguing that Whistle blower claims involve questions of both law and fact. Id. at
p. 10.

With respect to questions of law, the District Court's opm1on shows that it
believed it was obligated to review Idaho law and determine if Black engaged in activity that was
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protected. See R., pp. 000519-000523. Operating under this mistaken belief, the District Court
categorized Black's activity as "the questioning of authority" and held that it was unprotected
activity.

R., pp. 000520 and 000522. If Black had asserted a common law claim wrongful

termination based upon a retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy, Black would agree
the district court had an obligation to determine if the activity engaged in was protected.
However, in light of this Court's decision in Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 212 P.3d,
982 (2009), Black's claims were brought exclusively under the Whistleblower Act. R., 000006000011.

As such, there was no need for the district court to determine whether Black had

engaged in activity that was protected.

Instead, all that was required of the Court was to

determine, after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Black and drawing all reasonable
inferences in his favor, whether Black had engaged in any of the enumerated activities set forth
in Idaho Code§ 6-2104.

147 Idaho 558, 212 P.3d at 987 (noting that "[p]rotected activities

under the Whistle blower Act are described" in Idaho Code § 6-2104).
With respect to questions of fact under the Whistleblower Act, as this Court's
prior cases amply demonstrate, factual questions are for the jury to decide. The question of
whether an action was taken in good faith is a factual question to be decided by the jury. Curlee

v. Kootenai Co. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 400, 224 P.3d 458, 467 (2008). The question of
whether an action or belief was reasonable is a factual question to be decided by the jury. See

Anderson et al. v. Foster, 73 Idaho 340, 347, 252 P.2d 199, 203 (1953). Given these clearly
established standards, it is clear that a jury, not the district court, was to evaluate whether the
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facts demonstrate that Black made his communications in good faith or that Black's refusal was
based upon a reasonable belief of a violation of law.
ISP cites to the cases of Patterson v. Dept. of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310,
256 P.3d 718 (2011), and Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 212 P.3d, 982 (2009), in
support of its position that a district court may decide whether conduct is protected activity when
presented with undisputed facts. Neither of these cases provides the support ISP seeks.

Patterson addressed claims made under the Whistleblower Act as well as the
Idaho Human Rights Act ("IHRA").

151 Idaho at 315, 256 P.3d at 723.

The only

Whistleblower Act issue addressed by the Court under the claim was timely filed. Id. When
addressing the IHRA claims, the Court did address the trial court's holding as a matter of law
that the facts did not support a claim. Id. at 317-321, 256 P.3d 725-729. This Court sustained
the trial court's holding given that the facts presented did not demonstrate that members of a
protected class were treated differently from members of a non-protected class. Id. The Court
was able to make this determination by looking at the language of the IHRA itself. This Court
further held that the plaintiff could not have had an objectively reasonable belief that she was
engaging in protected activity given that the "great weight of case law did not support [her]
position." Id. at 321, 256 P.3d at 729 (citations omitted). In contrast to Patterson, there is no
Idaho case law which directly addresses Black's claims, nor does the "great weight of case law"
from other jurisdictions indicate that Black's position is erroneous. The lack of case supports
allowing this matter to proceed to trial for a jury determination of whether Black acted in good
faith and upon a reasonable belief.
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In Van, this Court did uphold dismissal of Whistleblower Act claims where the
claims were based upon "potential future waste, rather than past or present waste." 14 7 Idaho at
559, 212 P.3d at 989. However, this dismissal was upheld based upon the plain language of the
Whistleblower Act which mandates reports of present or past conduct, not potential future
conduct. Id.

Thus, to the extent the plaintiffs claims were based upon future conduct, the

plaintiffs action was not protected because it was not activity enumerated in the Whistleblower
Act. In contrast, Black reported past and present directives believed to be in violation of law.
As such, Black's conduct was an activity enumerated in Idaho Code § 6-2104 and was protected
activity.
As the foregoing demonstrates, Patterson and Van do not stand for the
proposition advocated by ISP. However, even if these decisions of the Court allowed a district
court to decide as a matter of law whether protected activity exists in the face of undisputed
facts, this case does not involve undisputed facts with respect to the good faith and reasonable
belief requirements. Black presented facts which he contends show the communication was in
good faith and reasonable. ISP contends that Black did not make the communication in good
faith and could not have had a reasonable belief of a law violation. Given that there is a factual
dispute among the parties as to these issues, this case should be allowed to proceed to trial.

2.

The District Court erred by holding that Black is only entitled to
protection i(he refitsed to perform an illegal act.

In response to Black's challenging the district court's holding that Black is only
entitled to protection if he refused to perform an act that was, in fact, illegal, ISP claims that
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what the district court held was that the "sort of illegality that Black claimed was not the sort
protected by the act." Response Br., p. 10-11 (citation omitted). This contention ignores the
plain language of the district court's opinion: "Thus, whistleblower case law from Idaho and
other jurisdictions shows that refusal is a protected activity only when the employee refuses to
perform an illegal act." R., p. 000522. This holding by the Court is in direct contravention of
this Court's holding in Van. Furthermore, it is clear from the district court's decision that this
erroneous interpretation of the Whistleblower Act was fundamental to its decision. As such,
Black respectfully requests that the district court's decision be reversed.

B.

The facts before the District Court and this Court present genuine issues of
material fact to be presented to a jury.

L.

Black has demonstrated that genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether he had a good faith belief of a suspected violation o(law. rule or
regulation and whether he refi1sed to adhere to a directive that he
reasonably believed to be in violation of the law.

ISP argues that Black has not demonstrated that the directives provided implicate
a suspected violation of law or rule. This issue was addressed at length in Black's opening brief
and will not be repeated in its entirety here. Opening Br., pp. 9-31. However, given ISP's
arguments, it is worth again repeating that Black believed the directives to be in violation of
Idaho Code§ 19-5116 and IDAPA 11.11.031. R., pp. 000233, 000409 (Russell Depa.), 103:1619, 000586-000587 (Black Depa.), 145:23 - 146:5, 146:7, 000610-000612, 000618-000623.
Likewise, it is worth repeating that Black testified that his beliefs and positions were developed
over a years of interaction with POST, POST Council, POST employees and his review of the
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statutes and regulations. R., pp., 000310-311,

ifi!

4-9, 000317,

if

36, 000397-000400, 000585

(Black Depa)., 141:21 -141:15, R., and p. 000586 (Black Depa.), 144:10-16.
ISP argues that merely questioning and defying authority is not entitled to
protection under the Whistleblower Act. Response Br., p. 12. Black would agree that where an
employee questions and refuses directives without a good faith and reasonable belief that the
directives are violations or suspected violations of law, no protection is afforded. However,
where the communication and/or refusal are based upon interpretation of statutes, rules or
regulations of the State, an employee is entitled to protection. Given that Black's actions were
directly based upon his interpretation of portions of the Idaho Code as well as IDAPA
regulations, ISP's argument fails.
2.

The entirety of Black's testimony demonstrates his belief that directives
were illegal or, if adhered to, would have required Black to commit an
illegal act.

ISP writes that Black admitted that nothing he was told would have forced him to
violate the law or do anything illegal.

Response Br., pp. 10 and 12.

In support of this

contention, ISP cites to a single page in the record. Id. What ISP fails to address is Black's
testimony that he believed the order to move Lori Guthrie "violated that ID APA rule[]" and that
he "would be in violation of IDAPA rules and Idaho Code on all of those if I complied with
them." R., pp. 000584-000585 (Black Depa.) at 135:21 - 136:1 and 138:5 - 8. Likewise, ISP
fails to address Black's testimony that seven (7) different directives from Col. Russell either
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were in violation of a rule, regulation or law or that would have put Black in violation of a rule,
regulation or law had Black adhered to the directive. R., pp. 589 (Black Depa.) at 154:1 -157:8.
This testimony of Black cannot be ignored at summary judgment. ISP asked the
district court to ignore this testimony and the district court erroneously accepted this invitation
and ignored this testimony.

ISP now asks this Court to ignore testimony in the record.

In

accordance with long-established summary judgment standards, Black requests that the Court
decline the invitation to ignore evidence and instead consider the evidence in the record in the
light most favorable to Black and to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in his
favor. When summary judgment standards are adhered to and all evidence is considered in the
proper light, it is clear that Black communicated in good faith belief a suspected violation of law,
rule or regulation. Likewise, it is clear that Black refused a directive based upon a reasonable
belief that the directive was in violation of law.

3.

The purpose of the Whistle blower Act is served bv allowing this matter to
proceed to trial.

ISP asserts that Black's contention has "sweeping implications" that cannot be
reconciled with statutes and rules related to public employment. Response Br., p. 12. This
argument fails. Black does not contend that an employee may simply refuse a directive based
upon a personal disagreement with a supervisor. On the contrary, Black merely contends, that
where an employee complies with the terms of the Whistleblower Act, he or she is entitled to
protection. This necessarily requires a finding that the refusal was made upon a reasonable belief
of a violation of law. Likewise, where the employee communicates concern about a directive or
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action, the communication must be made with a good faith belief that the directive or action is in
violation of law.
In Boelter v. City of Coon Rapids, the Court recognized that the refusal to follow
even a lawful directive is protected provided that there exists a good faith belief in the illegality
of the directive. 67 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (D. Minn. 1999). The plaintiff in Boelter contended that
the City's policy regarding military leave violated both state and federal laws. Id. at 1042.
Despite the fact that "[i]t [wa]s clear, in the Court's view, that the Military Time - Pay Request
form does not violate" the federal or state laws cited by the plaintiff, the Court denied the City's
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1050. The Court explained its decision:
This conclusion does not end the inquiry of whether [plaintiff] has
made out a claim under the whistleblower statute, contrary to
Defendants' suggestions. The relevant question, in establishing the
first element of a prima facie case, is whether [plaintiff] engaged in
statutorily-protected conduct. Minn. Stat. § I81.932, subd. l(a)
speaks to an employee who, "in good faith, reports a violation or
suspected violation" of the law. It is irrelevant, for purposes of this
subdivision, whether there was an actual violation of the law. The
"only requirement" is that the report of the violation or suspected
violation be "made in good faith." Good faith, moreover, is
normally a question of fact for the jury.
Id. (citations omitted).

Just as in Boelter, the Whistle blower Act does not require that the

directive be an actual violation. I.C. § 6-2104 and Van, 147 Idaho at 559, 212 P.3d 982. The
relevant inquiry and focus is on the good faith belief of the individual making the report and/or
refusing the directive. Allowing an employee to communicate a violation or suspected violation,
or refuse a directive upon a reasonable belief of a violation of law, even when the conduct
complained of ultimately is deemed to be lawful, promotes the "integrity of government" by
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fostering an environment where employees feel free to raise their concerns. See I.C. § 6-2104.
To hold otherwise would stifle the reporting of waste or violations of laws, rules or regulations
except in the most extreme circumstances.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff/Appellant Jeffry J. Black respectfully
requests that the Court reverse the District Court's decision granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings
including but not limited to trial.
DATED this 211 d day of October, 2012.
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC

B~~

Chad M. Nicholson
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiff
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